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That night, Schlichtmann went home and lay in bed trying to
sleep .... He thought about his reputation and career, about
the lawyers who'd said he was foolish to reject a million-dollar
offer, about Paul Carney in his wheelchair awaiting the verdict.
... At six o'clock, as he watched the sun rise over Boston
harbor, he called Rikki Klieman .... Should he take the million
dollars? ... Or should he wait for the jury's verdict? "You've
made your choice," Rikki said.... The jurors returned their
verdict that afternoon. They found the doctor and hospital
negligent and they awarded Paul Carney $4.7 million.1
The courtrooms and hearing rooms of the United States are filled with
Schlichtmanns, Carneys, and corporations, all seeking justice in the milieu
of American civil action. There is fundamental change underway in that
system, however, a change driven in part by the dilemma described above.
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The outcome of any civil action is often as much a roll of the dice as it is a
reasoned decision. Therefore, many corporations believe the American
system of civil justice in the 1990s is out of control. One of the foremost
trends in corporate America in recent years has been the shift from
traditional litigation and agency resolution of disputes toward the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). By using ADR, U.S. corporations
believe that they can overcome many of the negative aspects of our civil
justice system.
Although no one definition is universally accepted, we shall define
ADR as the use of any form of mediation or arbitration as a substitute for
the public judicial or administrative process available to resolve a dispute.2
One need only scan the business and legal press to see that, as compared to
a few years ago, many more disputes are being resolved through
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration! From the Attorney General of the
United States to agency rule-makers in many areas of government
regulation, policy makers at all levels of government have encouraged this
trend. Accompanying this public policy movement, increasing numbers of
law firms and corporate legal departments are establishing ADR practice
sections or hiring experts where none existed before.
4
The employment field is illustrative of this trend. In the field of
union-management relations, the established pattern has been for the
parties themselves to resolve nearly all disputes, rather than rely on the
courts. During the past thirty-five years, however, most individual
employees have been granted a long list of statutory rights, ranging from
protection from discrimination to pension protections to safer and healthier
workplaces. Each of these laws has been accompanied by a dispute
resolution process, often involving a federal or state government agency
and, ultimately, the court system. Over time, increasing frustration has
arisen because of the long delays to resolve disputes, the associated
expenses, and the outcomes produced. Thus, over the past few years the
trend has been toward the use of ADR in individual employment cases.'
2. For purposes of this discussion, mediation is defined as any form of dispute
resolution where one or more impartial persons assist the parties in reaching a settlement
but do not make a binding determination. Arbitration is defined as any form of dispute
resolution that involves the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a
final and binding determination. Thus, the critical distinction between mediation and
arbitration is whether the third-party neutral can or cannot make a binding determination in
the case. Arguably, every ADR technique can be categorized as either mediation or
arbitration, depending on whether it is nonbinding or binding.
3. See, e.g., Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TiMEs,
Mar. 10, 1997, at Al.
4. Using the key words "alternative dispute resolution" in the World Wide Web
search engine Alta Vista resulted in a list of over 1.3 million Web sites! Sampling some of
the sites suggests that many are maintained by law firms engaged in an ADR practice.
5. The Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations (hereafter the
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The courts have approved this trend, most notably in the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.6 In Gilmer,
the Court sanctioned mandatory arbitration of an age discrimination claim
as a substitute for resolving the complaint in the courts. Gilmer had
registered as a securities representative when he was initially hired and, in
that registration, had agreed to arbitrate any controversy arising over his
employment or its termination. Asserting that his employer had
terminated him because of his age, Gilmer sought to stay his agreement to
arbitrate and to have his claim resolved by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the courts. The Supreme Court
rejected his claim, saying that the Federal Arbitration Act allowed the
agreement to arbitrate to stand.7 The Court maintained that arbitration was
an appropriate forum for the resolution of his dispute, thus denying him
access to the procedures of the EEOC. In fact, the EEOC itself is now
among a wide-ranging group of federal and state agencies encouraging the
use of ADR as a substitute for statutorily devised dispute resolution
processes.8
Critical actors in this changing milieu are the corporations
themselves. Many corporations are now promoting the use of ADR in a
wide range of conflicts between the corporation and other businesses,
clients and customers, and their own employees. In each of these areas, it
Dunlop Commission), appointed by Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown and
Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich in 1993, in both its FACT FINDING REPORT (1994) and
its FINAL REPORT (1994) documented the explosion of litigation in the employment area:
As the Fact Finding Report discussed in detail, employment litigation has
spiraled in the last two decades .... In the federal courts alone, the number of
suits filed concerning employment grievances grew over 400% in the last two
decades. Complaints lodged with administrative agencies have risen at a
similar rate ....
DUNLOP COmISSION, FINAL REPORT 25 (1994). In the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a
dramatic growth of civil litigation in other areas of the law as well. Federal court filings
increased from 168,789 in 1990 to 230,597 in 1993 (that is, by 37%). The figures for
filings in state courts are comparable. See CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTI1ON, ADR
COST SAVINGS AND BENEFITS STUDIES (1994) [hereinafter ADR STUDIES] and references
cited therein. By 1997, federal court filings had climbed to 269,132. See Brigid
McMenamin, Unnatural Justice, FORBES, May 5, 1997, at 122-28.
6. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
7. See id. at 26-27.
8. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's policy statement on
alternative dispute resolution, July 17, 1995. Although the EEOC favors voluntary
agreements to use mediation and arbitration to resolve discrimination complaints, it opposes
the use of Gilmer-type pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. This clarification was contained
in a policy statement on binding arbitration issued on July 10, 1997. See William M.
Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec.
1995, at 40-50; Paul Steven Miller, EEOC Adopts ADR Methods, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec.
1995, at 17-87.
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appears that the time and cost associated with traditional litigation have
been important factors pushing corporations toward their growing use of
ADR processes.
The apparent trend of corporations to increase reliance on ADR
motivated our desire to conduct a survey of the general counsel of the
Fortune 1000 corporations. During the first four months of 1997, the
Computer-Assisted Survey Team (CAST) at Cornell University conducted
a mail and phone survey of the corporate counsel of the 1,000 largest U.S.-
based corporations for the Cornell/PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution.
The objective of the survey was to obtain comprehensive information
about each corporation's use of ADR from the person in the organization
responsible for, or most knowledgeable about, ADR. Interviews were
completed with 606 respondents. In roughly half the cases, the respondent
was the general counsel of the corporation; in the other half, the
respondent was either a deputy counsel or chief litigator. The survey
yielded a rich harvest of information about the use of ADR by major U.S.
corporations. In addition to the fixed-choice questions contained in the
survey instrument, CAST interviewers asked open-ended questions,
resulting in the gathering of valuable anecdotal material as well. The
survey findings discussed in this article are only a portion of our full
analysis of the survey results.9
Prior to this study, there had been only a handful of limited surveys of
how many corporations use ADR, what forms of ADR they use, what
kinds of disputes are resolved by ADR, and, perhaps most important, what
corporations believe about the future of ADR in American business.'0 We
believe that ADR has been in place long enough to permit judgments to be
made about some of the critical issues surrounding its use, including
whether ADR has resulted in significant changes in how disputes are
resolved between organizations.
9. Our full and final report is currently, at this writing, in draft form. See DAVID B.
LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE USE OF ADR IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: FINAL REPORT
(forthcoming). But see DAVID B. LIPsKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE USE OF ADR IN U.S.
CORPORATIONs: ExEcUTivE SUMMARY (1997).
10. In 1993, Deloitte and Touche conducted the major survey of this type to date. See
Deloitte Touche Tohinatsu International, Deloitte and Touche Litigation Services 1993
Survey of General and Outside Counsels: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (1993);
see also David W. Harwell & Michael E. Weinzierl, Alternatives to Business Law Suits,
Bus. & ECON. REv., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, for a discussion of the Deloitte and Touche
survey results. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) also surveyed 2,000 businesses
concerning their use of ADR in resolving discrimination complaints. See U.S. General
Accounting Office, Employment Discrimination: Most Private-Sector Employers Use
Congressional Requesters (1995). The General Accounting Office found that 90% of the
companies surveyed used one or more ADR methods for resolving discrimination
complaints, but few used arbitration. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Employers' Experiences with ADR in the Workplace (1997).
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I. EXPERIENCE WITH ADR PROCESSES
Our survey asked respondents about their experiences with not only
the commonly applied forms of ADR, i.e., mediation and arbitration, but
also with other processes and techniques that we suspected were less
widely used. Figure 1 shows respondents' experiences with the eight
forms of ADR about which we inquired. As the figure indicates, nearly all
our respondents reported some experience with ADR. They
overwhelmingly reported having used mediation (88%) and arbitration
(80%) at least once in the past three years.
Respondents had a significant range of experience with other forms of
ADR. More than 20% said they had used mediation-arbitration, mini-
trials, fact-finding, or employee in-house grievance procedures in the past
three years. Further, more than 10% of respondents, representing about
sixty corporations, had experience with even the least used forms of ADR,
ombudspersons and peer reviews." Thus, the breadth of penetration of
ADR into American business is substantial, even surprisingly so. When
asked to name their preferred form of ADR process, counsel
overwhelmingly reported mediation (63%); arbitration was a distant
second (18%).
FIGuRE 1
Experience with Forms of ADR among Fortune 1000 Companies
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11. Many sources give definitions of the ADR methods discussed here. See, e.g., ADR
STUDIES, supra note 5.
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II. WHY Do CORPORATIONS USE ADR?
Although it is clear that there is now widespread experience with
ADR in American business, the reasons for its popularity need further
explanation. Fundamentally, there are three situations that lead to the use
of ADR by corporations. First, corporate decision making in this area is
often ad hoc in nature because a particular dispute may arise in the course
of doing business for which opting for an alternative to litigation may be
desirable. Such case-by-case decision making may characterize much of
the use of ADR. Second, an important variation occurs, however, when
corporations agree in advance to use mediation or arbitration to resolve
disputes that will arise in the future. Our survey results suggest that a
growing number of corporations are incorporating ADR provisions in their
contracts, warranties, and other agreements. Third, corporations use ADR
when a court or an administrative agency orders the disputing parties to
attempt to resolve it themselves through mediation or arbitration. Such
court-ordered ADR has become prevalent in some jurisdictions in recent
years and plays a significant role in encouraging corporations to negotiate
when they might not otherwise do So.
Our survey asked respondents to explain why their corporations used
mediation and arbitration, allowing them to choose any of fourteen
possible reasons for doing so. These responses provide us with a
reasonably complete understanding of the forces that cause a company to
decide to mediate or arbitrate a particular dispute. Two of the more
significant forces that appear to be driving corporations to use ADR are the
cost of litigation and the length of time needed to reach resolution of the
dispute. Almost all of our respondents believe it is cheaper and more time
efficient to use ADR rather than rely on the courts. More than 80% of the
respondents told us that mediation saves time and money, while just under
70% told us that arbitration did so.
Saving time and money may be the most widely cited reasons for
using ADR, but corporations cite many other reasons as well. Our survey
results suggest that some corporations use ADR without first obtaining
adequate evidence that it will actually save their organizations money.
Indeed, a few corporations choose to use ADR even if doing so might cost
more money than litigation. However, in most cases, corporations use
ADR for a combination of reasons: to save time and money as well as to
achieve other objectives. Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents
who told us the factor listed in the table was a reason their corporation
12. For discussions of court-annexed ADR, see W.D. Brazil, Institutionalizing ADR
Programs in Courts, in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTs 52, 52-165
(F. Sander ed., ABA Litigation Section, 1991); Zev J. Eigen, Voluntary Mediation in New
York State, Disp. RESOL. J., Summer 1997, at 58-66.
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used either mediation or arbitration.
TABLE 1: REASONS COMPANIES USE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
(Percentage of respondents reporting each reason)
REASONS MEDIATION ARBITRATION
Uses expertise of neutral 53.2 49.9
Preserves good relationships 58.7 41.3
Required by contract 43.4 91.6
Provides more durable 31.7 28.3
resolution
Preserves confidentiality 44.9 43.2
Avoids legal precedents 44.4 36.9
More satisfactory settlements 67.1 34.8
More satisfactory process 81.1 60.5
Court mandated 63.1 41.9
Dispute involves international 15.3 31.9
parties
Allows parties to resolve 82.9
disputes themselves
Has limited discovery - 59.3
Standard industry practice 33.7
The most often cited reason for using mediation was that the process
allows parties to resolve the dispute themselves; no settlement can be
reached unless both sides agree to it. Approximately 83% of the
respondents said that this was one of the reasons they use mediation. In
contrast, of course, the use of both arbitration and the court system may
lead to decisions imposed on the parties with which they disagree.
The next three most cited reasons for using mediation are also linked
to the same theme, namely, that it offers the corporation greater control
over the dispute resolution process and its outcome. Eighty-one percent of
those surveyed said that mediation provided parties with a more
satisfactory process than litigation, 67% said it provided more satisfactory
settlements, and 59% reported that it preserves good relationships. In sum,
these responses indicate that mediation provides not just an alternative
means to conventional dispute resolution, but also a superior process for
reaching a resolution.
The remaining reasons for using mediation were not as widely
supported by our respondents. More than half the respondents saw the
mediator's expertise as an advantage of the process. For example, the
general counsel of a Midwest financial services corporation expressed this
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opinion: "Mediators are sometimes good and sometimes bad, but they are
generally better than arbitrators." Later in this article, we will discuss the
apparent ambivalence about the qualifications of mediators and arbitrators.
Finally, some parties engage in mediation because it is required by
contract (43%) or is court mandated (63%).
In the open-ended portion of our interviews, our respondents
elaborated on their reasons for choosing to mediate, as the following
comments illustrate:
One reason we use mediation is because we have a lot of
environmental disputes involving complicated scientific issues,
and we can select a mediator who knows more about such issues
than a judge would.
Mediation creates an environment in which the parties can speak
freely about their perspective on the merits of the claim. There
doesn't seem to be the filtering that occurs in the courtroom.
Mediation allows each side to understand what's really important
to the other side. It's not always simply a matter of money.
Sometimes a simple apology can go a long way to resolving a
dispute.
In employment law disputes, mediation provides a catharsis for
people who think they've been wrongly injured. It helps them
get over their problem.
Turning to the results presented in Table 1, the overwhelming reason
that respondents gave for using arbitration was that the arbitration was
required by contract; in other words, the corporation had, in effect, agreed
to pursue this route before the dispute arose.
In general, the support for arbitration among corporations is not as
strong as the support for mediation. 13 For example, just over 60% of
respondents said they believed arbitration provides a more satisfactory
process than litigation. This suggests that while "satisfactory process" is a
powerful motive for using arbitration, it is clearly a much stronger motive
for using mediation. Likewise, respondents supported the other process-
control reasons for using arbitration in smaller, albeit significant, numbers.
As one respondent representing the view of a large insurance company
stated, "Arbitration is cheaper [than litigation], faster, confidential, final,
and binding. What more can I say?"
In addition to these differences, some other variations emerged in
respondents' views of mediation and arbitration. Although two-thirds
thought that mediation produces more satisfactory settlements than
13. See Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at
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litigation, only about one-third held that view of arbitration. Nearly 60%
believed mediation preserves good relationships, while 41% believed this
to be true of arbitration. In sum, although there is strong support for the
belief that arbitration saves time and money, there is much less support for
the notion that arbitration has value as a means of controlling the process
of dispute resolution.
I. EXPLAINING THE GROWTH OF ADR
Why has the use of ADR increased so dramatically in recent years?
After all, arbitration, mediation, and other ADR techniques have been
around for a century, if not longer. Some observers trace their use to
biblical times. In labor-management relations, arbitration and mediation
were first used in the nineteenth century. Commercial arbitration dates to
an even earlier period. 4 In the previous section of this paper, we showed
that corporations use ADR because they believe it is cheaper and quicker
than litigation. However, complaints about the excessive costs and delays
associated with litigation are certainly not new; one has only to consider,
for example, Charles Dickens's vivid depiction of the never-ending civil
suit Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Bleak House. Why, then, is the ADR
"revolution" so recent in origin?
Our study suggests that the rapid spread of ADR techniques in the
United States is a consequence of a unique convergence of several
important societal factors. These factors include the growing competitive
pressures faced by American businesses, their increasing frustration with
the legal system, and a consequent trend toward the use of court and
contractual mandates that require the use of ADR.
A. Competitive Pressure
The key factor that explains the increased use of ADR is the
competitive market pressure faced by American corporations. Through
most of the post-World War II period, many American corporations were
insulated from international competition. Eventually, however, this
insulation diminished, and by the 1980s, most American corporations felt
the full effects of global competitive pressures. To compete effectively in
global and domestic markets, American corporations went through a wave
of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers. They also engaged in downsizing,
reengineering, and restructuring. All of these factors combined, we
14. "Arbitration has an ancient lineage and an active present. King Solomon, Phillip II
of Macedon and George Washington employed arbitration. Commercial arbitration has
been used in England and the United States for hundreds of years." LEONARD L. RiSriN &
JAMEs E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 215 (1987).
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suggest, provide a motive for corporations to use ADR.
In other words, the corporate quest in the 1980s to be more efficient
and more cost effective led corporations, in time, to examine the costs
associated with their legal affairs. Many of our survey respondents
identified these corporate cost pressures as a major factor motivating them
to adopt ADR. Some of them told us that the "transaction" costs
associated with settling a dispute, including the costs of inside and outside
legal counsel, the costs associated with expert witnesses, and so forth,
were often two to three times the amounts of the settlements themselves.
15
The corporation would often invest considerable money and energy from
the time of the initial filings in a court suit, through interrogatories and
depositions, to the time of the trial itself, and then, in 90% of all cases,
settle "on the courthouse steps" or in the judge's chambers. It was in this
context that many corporations began to assess the possibility of using
mediation or arbitration to save the time and money associated with
litigation.
Corporate efforts to find more efficient and effective ways of doing
business often resulted in the corporation focusing on its legal department.
Some of our respondents told us that their departments had been
downsized and restructured. Top management, we were told, had required
the corporate counsel to cut his or her budget. Relationships with outside
law firms were redefined. The corporate counsel, often at the urging of the
company's CEO, carefully assessed the use of ADR as a cost-saving
measure.
B. Frustration with the Legal System
Another set of factors, largely independent of competitive forces, was
also driving corporations to use ADR. These factors can be summed up
with the term "frustration with the legal system." It is, of course, well
known that federal and state regulation of corporate behavior multiplied in
the post-World War II period. In the area of employment law alone,
Congress passed at least two dozen major statutes regulating employment
conditions in the period from 1960 to 1990, including the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, Employee
Retirement Income Security Act in 1974, the Americans with Disabilities
Act in 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993. More and more dimensions of corporate behavior
were brought under the scrutiny, not only of the court system, but also of a
multitude of regulatory agencies. In the employment area alone, corporate
counsel had to cope with new areas of litigation ranging from sexual
15. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 25.
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harassment and accommodation of the disabled, to age discrimination and
wrongful termination. Many of the courts and administrative agencies
became burdened with backlogs of cases, and, as many of our respondents
commented, the delays in settling these disputes became intolerable. The
frustration brought on by these problems was another motivating factor for
corporations to adopt alternative dispute resolution.
C. Court and Contract Mandates
Legislators and policy makers were not oblivious to the stresses of
our legal system. In many situations, they responded by encouraging the
use of ADR. In 1990, for example, Congress passed the Civil Justice
Reform Act, which required each federal district court "to assess its
dockets and to develop a plan for civil-case management to reduce costs
and delays."'6 In many jurisdictions this requirement led the district court
to institute an ADR program.' The court systems in more than half the
states now encourage, or even mandate, the use of ADR to reduce state
backlogs and to expedite the resolution of disputes. A growing number of
administrative agencies, such as the federal EEOC and state-level workers'
compensation boards, have begun to encourage the use of ADR to resolve
complaints that would otherwise need to be handled by the agency itself.
In addition, companies are increasingly incorporating mandatory ADR
provisions in contracts they negotiate with their vendors, suppliers,
customers, and employees.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also been inclined to favor the use of
ADR, especially in employment disputes. As noted earlier, the Court in
Gilmer held that an employment contract provision requiring an employee
to use arbitration to resolve a claim arising under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act was enforceable by the courts. The initial application
of the Gilmer principle to age discrimination suits in the securities industry
has subsequently been broadened to apply to other statutes in other
industries. In this context, the significance of the Gilmer decision is that it
allows employers to require their employees to agree to employment
contracts that substitute the use of arbitration for litigation in disputes
where, arguably, a statutory violation has occurred. Subsequent court
decisions, however, have made it clear that there are limitations on the
16. J.S. KAKALrK ET. AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INExPENsIVE? AN EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 1 (1996).
17. The RAND Corporation conducted an evaluation of ten "pilot" courts and found
that "some case management procedures-for example, certain types of alternative dispute
resolution-have no major effects on cost and delay." Id. Some ADR proponents have
been critical of the RAND study, however, arguing in part that several of the ADR pilot
programs evaluated in the study had design deficiencies.
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applications of Gilmer." For our purposes, it is significant to note that the
courts' support of ADR has spurred its use in major corporations.
IV. BARRIERS TO THE GROWTH OF ADR
In our interviews with corporate counsel, we discovered that there
were several key reasons why corporations chose not to use ADR. Some
lawyers told us, for example, that they would use ADR only if and when
senior management supported it. Although the counsel's office can
usually exercise broad discretion in its choice to use or not to use ADR in
routine disputes, the use of ADR in disputes involving important legal
principles or potentially large settlements ordinarily requires the support of
top managers. In a majority of disputes, counsel's office may have the
authority to decide to use ADR; but the bigger the case and the higher the
stakes, the more likely it is that the CEO or the chairman of the board will
be involved in the decision to use ADR. Also, adopting the routine use of
ADR as a matter of corporate policy usually requires the involvement of
both the counsel's office and other top managers. In our survey, we
identified approximately seventy three corporations (12% of our sample)
that have strong pro-ADR policies and claim that they try to use ADR in
all disputes. Most of these corporations told us they have conflict
management systems (discussed below), an emerging phenomenon in
American corporations. The adoption of a conflict management system is
often a strategic decision and is likely to involve the CEO and other top
managers in addition to the general counsel.
Our interviews also suggested that the use of ADR was sometimes
viewed as threatening by middle managers, who, on the one hand, make
many decisions that are the source of corporate disputes yet, on the other
hand, want their decisions to be supported by the corporation. If top
management uses ADR to arrive at negotiated agreements that
compromise these decisions, middle managers may feel that their authority
is undermined. A representative from a leading pharmaceutical company
told us that while it had estimated that the use of ADR would save the
18. Circuit courts have disagreed on the extent of the application of Gilmer. The Tenth
Circuit has, for example, applied Gilmer to Title VII claims. See Metz v. Merrill, 39 F.3d
1482 (10th Cir. 1994). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that Gilmer does not apply to
Title VII claims. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Third Circuit, applying Gilmer, held that claims arising under ERISA are arbitrable.
See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993). Various other courts have
upheld the use of the Gilmer principle in cases involving antitrust, malpractice, RICO,
disability, trademark, and several federal and state discrimination statutes, and in the
communications, electronics, utility, and automobile industries. A comprehensive and
annotated list of court cases is contained in KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER,
LLP, Is THE BRAvE NEW WORLD OF EMPLOYMENT ADR RIGHT FOR MY COMPANY? (1997).
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company millions of dollars in litigation costs, it had not instituted such a
policy because its middle managers thought using ADR would undercut
their authority.
Some of our respondents also told us they did not use ADR because,
as compared to litigation, it was still too difficult to initiate. That is, in
some respects it was still easier to initiate a court suit than to pursue
mediation or arbitration. Why is this? Quite simply, because using ADR
usually requires the agreement of the opposing party in a dispute and
reaching such an agreement through negotiations with an adversary can be
difficult. A negotiator may feel that his or her willingness to consider
ADR will be interpreted as a sign of weakness by his or her adversary.
Even if one party understands the potential gains to both disputants
from opting for ADR, there is clearly no guarantee that the adversary party
will have the same assessment. The use of ADR requires a level of
sophistication that one of the parties may not have. The opposing party in
a lawsuit brought against a corporation may have an emotional investment
in the dispute that prevents it from understanding the potential benefits of
ADR. Moreover, the use of ADR to resolve disputes tends to blur, if not
eliminate, the distinction between winners and losers. Corporate counsel
may not care about this, but it may be important to an opposing lawyer. If
an opposing counsel, and his client, believe there is a chance for a big
"victory" in a suit against a major corporation, their inclination to use
ADR may be seriously limited.
Therefore, because the use of ADR generally requires a negotiated
agreement between the disputants, and because there are numerous barriers
to achieving such agreements, there may be a tendency to resort to
litigation even when the benefits of using ADR are apparent. Indeed,
several survey respondents emphasized that using ADR requires a change
in the disputants' mind-sets-that is, in the culture of handling disputes-
and not merely the ad hoc consideration of alternative methods for
resolving them.
V. ASPECTS OF THE ADR PROCESS COMPANmEs FiND UNDESIRABLE
Some companies do not use ADR because they find aspects of the
mediation or arbitration process undesirable, including some of the very
same characteristics that other companies find advantageous. For
example, ADR processes are not usually confined to legal rules, such as
those governing the admissibility of evidence and the examination of
witnesses. Arbitrators may consider hearsay evidence, and advocates may
lead their witnesses. Discovery is seldom a part of the mediation process
and is used only slightly more often in arbitration, particularly when the
parties request it. There are very few procedural constraints on the
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behavior of mediators.19 A general counsel from a public utility told us,
"Cost isn't the issue-it's the lack of rules. Litigation may be expensive,
but it does have rules. Unless we see a fair and quick resolution, we don't
use mediation." In some disputes, the lack of legal rules and constraints
helps to expedite settlement. In other disputes, corporate lawyers may
prefer the procedural safeguards provided by conventional litigation. This
especially appears to be the case in disputes involving important legal
principles.
For decades, federal courts have been inclined to defer to decisions
made by arbitrators. Most state courts also have developed comparable
policies. The courts have consistently supported the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate entered into by the disputants. At the same time,
they have granted arbitrators broad discretion to decide issues of
arbitrability-that is, what matters are or are not arbitrable under
arbitration agreements. The courts also have allowed arbitrators
considerable latitude in fashioning appropriate remedies. As long as an
arbitrator holds a full and fair hearing, allows each party to make a full and
complete presentation of its case, and arrives at a decision that is neither
arbitrary nor capricious nor "repugnant" to public policy, the courts will
normally refuse to consider an appeal.' The broad discretion the courts
have granted arbitrators and the virtual finality of arbitrators' decisions
have made arbitration a desirable alternative to litigation in many cases. In
other cases, however, as our respondents noted, these characteristics of
arbitration are precisely why corporations may opt not to use it.
Several of our respondents noted that the arbitration process is
beginning to match litigation in costliness and complexity. The counsel
from a large energy company stated that "arbitration is proving to be just
as burdensome as litigation. The opposition can use arbitration to elongate
the process. It can take over six months simply to agree on an arbitration
panel. You can be constantly running back to arbitrators for decisions on
discovery. It is a process fraught with potential abuse." This view was
echoed in the comments of a respondent from a major paper products
19. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14 (1987); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH,
MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1994).
20. The landmark Supreme Court cases in this area are usually referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960). These cases involve agreements to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining
agreements. They should be distinguished from cases like Gilmer and others cited herein,
which do not involve collective bargaining agreements. In the collective bargaining arena,
the Court continues to give great deference to agreements to arbitrate, unless the complaint
involves an alleged violation of Title VII. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974).
CORPORATE EMBRACE OF ADR
corporation: "Arbitration oftentimes includes the worst characteristics of
litigation without any of the benefits. The arbitrator can let anything into
the record, and the process can be every bit as expensive and burdensome
as civil litigation."
For many corporations, the decision to use ADR (or to adopt pro-
ADR policies) is apparently a pragmatic one, based largely on an analysis
of the costs and benefits of using ADR as compared to the costs and
benefits of resorting to litigation. As one respondent told us:
In some cases it's simply not appropriate to use mediation, and
in other cases it is. In some cases the dollar amount of the claim
isn't high enough to waste your time on mediation. We believe
the benefit from mediation comes in cases involving multiple
claimants and more than a million dollars in claims.
It is widely recognized that the use of either mediation or arbitration
tends to result in compromise settlements. Mediators attempt to persuade
negotiators to make offers and counteroffers until a compromise
agreement is reached. Arbitrators, it has been observed, consider the
positions the parties have presented at the hearing and then make an award
that "splits the difference" between the parties' positions.2' The perceived
tendency of ADR to produce compromise settlements can serve as a
barrier to the use of mediation and arbitration, according to a significant
number of our respondents. As the counsel for a food products corporation
told us:
We're reluctant to use binding arbitration. If the matter in
dispute is very serious or involves great amounts of money, then
we don't use arbitration because arbitrators have a strong
tendency to compromise, rather than do what may be right.
Minor matters may be arbitrated but not major ones. We may be
more likely to use mediation in both major and minor cases, but
we don't have a set policy.
21. To counter the tendency of arbitrators to split the difference in conventional interest
arbitration, one author proposed the use of "final-offer arbitration" (FOA), which requires
the arbitrator to choose either the final position of one party in an arbitration proceeding or
the final position of the other. See Carl M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible
with Bargaining? INDus. REL., Feb. 1996, at 38-52. Subsequently, several states included
FOA in their public-sector bargaining statutes as a means of resolving impasses in contract
negotiations. Major league baseball wrote the procedure into its basic collective bargaining
agreement as a means of resolving salary disputes between individual players and their
owners. See Henry S. Farber, An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, J. CONFLICT RESOL.,
Dec. 1980, at 683-705 (analyzing interest arbitration in public-sector collective bargaining);
Henry S. Farber, Splitting-the-Difference in Interest Arbitration, INDUS. REL. REv., Oct.
1981, at 70-78 (same); RIcHARD A. LESTER, LABOR ARBITRATION IN STATE AND LocAL
GOVERNmENT (1984) (same). However, FOA is rarely, if ever, used outside public-sector
bargaining and baseball.
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Again, when a corporation believes that a dispute involves an
important matter of principle, it is less willing to consider a process in
which concession and compromise are inherent characteristics. A lawyer
from a prominent Midwestern manufacturing company told us that it
avoided the use of ADR because it wanted to establish a reputation as a
company that would never compromise in critical disputes. This company
maintained that, in the long run, a reputation for fighting in every major
dispute would serve as a deterrent to lawsuits and save it money. Another
respondent from a corporation based in California stated: "Sometimes we
want a total victory in a lawsuit. We want to inflict some pain and
suffering on our adversary. In those cases we're not likely to use
mediation."
Finally, a surprising number of respondents told us they did not use
ADR because they lacked trust and confidence in ADR neutrals, especially
arbitrators. Although there is no shortage of individuals available to serve
as mediators and arbitrators, many of our respondents believe that there is
a shortage of truly qualified neutrals. For example, a company in the
maritime business had trouble finding an arbitrator with special knowledge
of both maritime law and the international law of the sea. Under these
circumstances, it preferred to litigate the dispute rather than take a chance
on an arbitrator lacking the necessary expertise.
The various factors impeding the use of ADR are summarized in
Table 2. In our survey, we asked the respondents to tell us whether or not
these factors were important in their companies' decision not to use ADR.
Table 2 summarizes these results. Overwhelmingly, our respondents
indicated that the principal reason they did not use either mediation or
arbitration was because the opposing party in the dispute was unwilling to
agree to it. In the case of mediation, three-quarters of the respondents said
they did not use it because the opposing party was unwilling; the figure for
arbitration was 63%. Approximately 40% of our respondents said they did
not use mediation because it was a nonbinding procedure and resulted in
compromise outcomes. In the case of arbitration, 54% said they did not
use it because arbitrators' decisions were difficult to appeal. About 49%
did not like the fact that arbitration hearings are not confined to legal rules.
As previously noted, these features are often viewed as advantages of the
arbitration process, and yet many of our respondents view them as barriers
to its use. Approximately half of our respondents indicated that when they
did not use arbitration, it was because it resulted in compromise outcomes.
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TABLE 2: BARRIERS TO ADR USE
(in percent)
BARRIER MEDIATION ARBITRATION
No desire from senior 28.6 35.0
management
Too costly 3.9 14.8
Too complicated 4.6 9.9
Nonbinding 40.9 _
Difficult to appeal 54.3
Not confined to legal rules 28.1 48.6
Lack of corporate experience 24.7 25.9
Unwillingness of opposing 75.7 62.8
party
Results in compromised 39.8 49.7
outcomes
Lack of confidence in neutrals 29.0 48.3
Lack of qualified neutrals 20.2 28.4
Risk of exposing strategy 28.6
A significant proportion of our respondents (29% in the case of
mediation and 35% in the case of arbitration) said they did not use ADR
techniques because senior management had no desire to use them. As we
noted above, the active involvement and support of senior management is
especially necessary when important matters of strategy, policy, or
principle are involved.
Very few respondents indicated that they did not use mediation
because it was "too costly" or "too complicated." As Table 2 shows, these
considerations were somewhat more important in the decision not to use
arbitration, but much less important than the other barriers listed in the
table. One respondent representing a corporation headquartered in Indiana
had a negative view of mediation: "We've decided as a company we don't
want to use mediation. We feel in nonbinding situations it's just an added
step. It costs us time and money, and it just leads into other steps in the
litigation process. We don't think we're achieving anything when we use
mediation."
The following negative views reflect the opinions of a small minority
of the respondents in our study. Nonetheless, they provide some
understanding of why other companies do not use mediation:
Generally mediation is only used at the end of the long drawn-
out part of the discovery process and you're pretty much into
trial by then. It really doesn't save time.
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Using mediation can be more complicated than litigation. When
it works it avoids costs, but when it doesn't work it is basically
going to trial twice.
We don't use mediation anymore. I can't think of any
circumstance where we found mediation to be productive.
Not a lot of people are familiar with mediation, and it's always a
battle to get people to agree to it unless they've been through it
before. And lawyers are more afraid of it than the parties.
VI. CONCERNS ABOUT NEUTRALS' QUALIFICATIONS
The respondents' concerns about the qualifications of neutrals
requires further elaboration. We asked our respondents where their
companies obtained their mediators and arbitrators. Figure 2 summarizes
their responses. As shown, well over half the respondents said they
obtained their arbitrators from a "private ADR provider," primarily the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and JAMS/Endispute. Other
providers that were mentioned included the Center for Public Resources,
the Chamber of Commerce, and, in the case of corporations in financial
services, the National Association of Securities Dealers. In contrast to
arbitration, major corporations appear to use several different sources to
obtain mediators. Approximately 20% of the respondents said their
mediators were assigned by the courts, reflecting the growth of court-
annexed mediation. The AAA and JAMS/Endispute are also important
providers of mediators, but our respondents said word-of-mouth was
equally important.
FIGURE 2
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Our respondents' views regarding the qualifications of ADR neutrals
are summarized in Table 3. The level of satisfaction is generally high.
More than 93% of the respondents told us they thought the mediators and
arbitrators they used were either somewhat qualified or very qualified.
These results should be interpreted carefully, however. As Table 3 shows,
only 27% of the respondents thought the arbitrators they used were very
qualified, whereas two-thirds thought they were only somewhat qualified.
We cannot say with certainty what each respondent actually meant by the
term "somewhat qualified," although a comment made by one respondent
may provide some guidance. He told us that his corporation had been
involved in quite a few arbitration cases and that the qualifications of the
arbitrators in these cases varied significantly. Some were very qualified
and others were not. In our survey, he answered "somewhat qualified" as
a way of suggesting the average quality of the arbitrators his company had
used.
TABLE 3: SATISFACTION WITH QUALIFICATIONS OF ADR NEUTRALS
(in percent)
OPINION MEDIATORS ARBITRATORS
Very qualified 41.2 26.8
Somewhat qualified 53.3 66.1
Not qualified 1.0 1.7
Don't know 4.6 5.4
percentage who have a lack of 29.0 48.3
confidence in
mediators/arbitrators
percentage who say there is a 20.2 28.4
lack of qualified
mediators/arbitrators
It may be disturbing that so many respondents believed that
arbitrators were only somewhat qualified, especially given that, as Table 3
shows, nearly half the respondents said they lacked confidence in
arbitrators. Overall, it appears that our respondents' evaluations of
mediators and arbitrators are mixed. In general, they are satisfied with the
qualifications of the neutrals they have used, but they have reservations
about some of them. This especially appears to be the case where
specialized expertise is required. As one respondent noted: "We have a lot
of intellectual property disputes, but we don't think arbitrators do a good
job with them. There simply aren't any qualified arbitrators in this area."
Several of our respondents believed that better training programs for
neutrals is needed, while others recommended improving the means o;
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certifying neutrals' expertise.
VII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
As we proceeded with the analysis of our survey data, an
unanticipated finding emerged. A significant number of respondents told
us that their companies had developed, or planned to develop, what can
best be described as a conflict management system. Such a system
incorporates the use of ADR, but also emphasizes dispute prevention.
Front-line managers and supervisors are explicitly given responsibility for
preventing conflicts from arising. If disputes do occur, the manager is
given considerable authority to resolve them, consistent, of course, with
the company's interests. The manager's accountability for the prevention
and resolution of disputes is accompanied by a change in the corporation's
reward and recognition system. Conflict management is assessed during
the manager's performance reviews, and pay adjustments and promotions
depend in part on the manager's success in this area. In some companies,
albeit a minority, a formula for charging back the costs of disputes (or at
least a portion of them) to the responsible manager's budget may be
instituted.22
Corporations engaged in conflict management tend to use a variety of
procedural devices for handling disputes. Many combine an in-house
grievance procedure with other prevention measures. Some corporations
have invested in various training programs. These programs use a variety
of formats, including traditional classroom training as well as role playing
and interactive exercises that focus on making sure that employees
understand the application of statutes and policies that are associated with
their responsibilities. Corporations that have adopted conflict management
systems tend to have training programs for various groups of employees
ranging from top-level managers to rank-and-file workers. Some
corporations also engage in ongoing compliance reviews with their
employees.
Our survey instrument did not ask respondents directly whether their
companies had a conflict management system. After the fact, however, we
realized we had asked about various components of such a system. For
example, we asked respondents whether their companies offered conflict
resolution training. Figure 3 shows that a strong relationship exists
between a corporation's ADR policy and the training it provides in conflict
resolution. Eighty percent of the companies where the policy is to pursue
22. See, e.g., CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINE SIicLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1996); J.M BRETr ET AL., MANAGING CONFLICT: THE
STRATEGY OF DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN (1994); W.L. URY ET AL., GETrING DISPUTES
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT (1988).
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"ADR always" also make conflict resolution training available, whereas
only 20% of the companies that "litigate always" do so. Indeed, we found
a strong association between companies that have a strong pro-ADR policy
and those that have an in-house grievance procedure, use peer review, use
ADR broadly in many kinds of disputes, and provide training in conflict
resolution. Our findings suggest that in many companies with strong ADR
policies, ADR is not simply a set of techniques added to others the
company uses, but represents a change in the company's mind-set about
how it needs to manage conflict.
FIGURE 3
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VIII. THE FUTURE OF ADR IN U.S. CORPORATIONS
Is it reasonable to expect that the use of ADR by U.S. corporations
will continue to grow in the future? We asked the respondents in our
survey a series of questions designed to determine their views on this
issue. In general, a large majority of the respondents in our survey believe
they are "likely" or "very likely" to use mediation in the future: 46% said
they are very likely and 38% said they were likely to use it. However, they
were more cautious about the use of arbitration. Only 24% said they were
very likely to use arbitration in the future, while 47% said they were likely
to do so. More than 29% said they were "unlikely" or "very unlikely" to
use arbitration in the future, whereas only 16% answered similarly in the
case of mediation. Nevertheless, if these projections are accurate, the use
of ADR by U.S. corporations will grow significantly. It may also be the
case, however, that our respondents' views simply reflect their current
levels of satisfaction with these ADR processes. On balance, they are
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more satisfied with mediation than with arbitration and, accordingly,
believe that their companies will use mediation more than arbitration in the
future.
Further projections about future trends can be obtained by examining
the respondents' views about the likelihood that their companies will use
ADR to resolve specific types of disputes. Figure 4 shows that our
respondents believe their companies will use mediation much more
frequently in some kinds of disputes than in others. They predict, for
example, that the use of mediation will grow significantly in employment
and commercial disputes. On balance, they also expect the use of
mediation to grow significantly in disputes involving environmental,
intellectual property, personal injury, real estate, and construction issues.
They predict more modest growth in the use of mediation in disputes
involving consumer rights and product liability. By contrast, they do not
anticipate that mediation will be used extensively in disputes involving
corporate finance and financial reorganization.
As shown in Figure 4, our respondents' predictions about the future
use of arbitration differ markedly from their predictions regarding
mediation. Our respondents believe that the use of arbitration will grow
significantly in only two areas: commercial disputes and employment
disputes. Many of our respondents (approximately 40%) believe that in a
variety of disputes, arbitration will be used to the same extent in the future
as it is now. Significant proportions (approximately 20 to 25%), however,
believe that in most types of disputes arbitration will not be used at all. If
these predictions are taken at face value, then we can expect the use of
arbitration actually to decline significantly in many types of disputes:
corporate finance, financial reorganization, consumer rights,
environmental, and so forth. Again, these "predictions" may simply be
proxies for the attitudes of corporate counsel about the current practice of
arbitration.
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FIGURE 4
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON FUTURE USE OF
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN VARIOUS DISPUTES
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In summary, Figure 4 underscores our respondents' predictions that
the use of both mediation and arbitration will grow substantially in only
employment and commercial/contract disputes. The figure also indicates
that our respondents believe that, in the future, both mediation and
arbitration will be used less frequently in corporate finance and financial
reorganization disputes. Finally, our results suggest that, in all other kinds
of disputes, our respondents project net growth in the use of mediation and
net decline in the use of arbitration.
The significance of these findings is worth considering further.
Financial matters are the core responsibility of corporate management.
The corporation's survival is more likely to be linked to this area of its
business than to other areas in which disputes may arise. We believe that
our results suggest that where the stakes are very high, corporations prefer
to fight their battles in front of judges rather than in front of mediators or
arbitrators.
In contrast, the use of mediation and arbitration in employment and
commercial disputes has a long, well-established history. Admittedly,
potential damages can be in the multimillion dollar range, but generally,
the stakes are much lower and the survival of the corporation is not usually
an issue. Employment and commercial disputes are further removed from
the core of managerial responsibility; they often involve matters handled
by the human resource, purchasing, or sales function. In these types of
disputes, according to the majority of our respondents, ADR is an
attractive alternative to litigation, and nonbinding forms of third-party
intervention, such as mediation, are used readily. In addition, the
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corporation is often willing to delegate decision-making authority to
impartial arbitrators.
In most types of disputes, however, as Figure 4 shows, mediation is a
popular alternative to litigation, but arbitration is not. Our respondents
seem to be saying that they are willing to use nonbinding, third-party
techniques to assist them in negotiating personal injury, product liability,
environmental, and certain other kinds of disputes, but are unwilling to
delegate decision-making authority to third parties. We speculate that
these attitudes may change as major U.S. corporations become more
familiar with the use of ADR.
IX. CONCLUSION
Our survey results suggest that there are important differences in the
use of mediation and arbitration and in managers' perceptions of these
techniques. For example, the decision to use mediation is predominantly
made on a case-by-case basis by the parties involved in the dispute,
whereas arbitration is typically invoked by a contractual requirement
negotiated by the parties at some point in the past. The choice to use
mediation tends to be more ad hoc in nature, and its use depends on mutual
agreement by the disputants on a case-by-case basis. The choice to use
arbitration is less ad hoc in nature. Parties in a relationship generally
incorporate its use into their contracts because they want to use it to
resolve all future disputes arising under those contracts.
It can be said that mediation is more tactical in nature, whereas
arbitration is more strategic. Mediation is more flexible, whereas
arbitration is more rigid. Mediation is more like assisted negotiation,
whereas arbitration is more like a legal proceeding. Corporate counsel in
major U.S. corporations have had very widespread experience in the use of
mediation. Familiarity, in this case, has bred affection. They have used
the process, and they think it works. They have had slightly less
experience with arbitration, and a significant number have never had the
occasion to use it. Of those who have used it, many like it and plan to use
it again. But, some do not like it and do not plan to use it again.
Mediation has been used to resolve all types of disputes in corporate
America, whereas the use of arbitration has tended to be confined to
certain types of disputes, particularly those involving employment and
commercial matters. Our respondents, as noted above, expect the use of
mediation to grow significantly across the board. By contrast, they predict
that the use of arbitration will be limited to a narrow range of disputes in
the future. Our respondents like mediation because they believe it
increases their control over the management and resolution of disputes.
They are uneasy about arbitration, in part because they believe they are
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less able to control the process.
Our survey results suggest that corporations turn to a variety of
sources to obtain mediators. They often rely on word-of-mouth and like to
use mediators they have worked with in the past. In contrast, the channels
used to obtain arbitrators are more developed and more limited in number.
The AAA, for example, continues to be a major source of arbitrators in a
variety of disputes. Although our respondents are generally satisfied with
the level of competence among mediators and arbitrators, they express
concerns about the availability of truly qualified neutrals. They especially
seem to be concerned about the qualifications of arbitrators. Finally,
mediation is being used in virtually every industry, whereas the use of
arbitration is more concentrated in industries such as construction,
transportation, and utilities.
An accurate understanding of the use of ADR in corporate America is
not possible unless one recognizes the critical ways in which the use of,
and perceptions of, arbitration and mediation differ. Our corporate
respondents, in general, have more favorable views of mediation than of
arbitration, believe mediation has more widespread applicability, and
believe it is more likely to save time and money. Although they have
greater reservations about arbitration than about mediation, they
nevertheless believe arbitration may be a very useful tool in targeted
situations.
We believe our survey results provide important new insights into the
use of ADR by major U.S. corporations. At the same time, we recognize
the limitations of our survey. There are other views of the ADR
movement, including important critiques of this trend. 2 We recognize that
we provide an important look at ADR, but by no means the only lens
through which it should be examined. We have obtained the views of a
significant segment of the corporate community-corporate counsel,
deputy counsel, and chief litigators-but it would be interesting to know
the views of other key segments of the corporation-senior managers,
middle managers, employees, and so forth. Because of the growing
importance of ADR in employment and workplace disputes, it would be
especially interesting to obtain the views of human resource managers. To
conduct a truly comprehensive assessment of the use of ADR in U.S.
corporations, it would be essential to obtain the views of other parties
involved in corporate disputes, such as those who bring suit against, or are
sued by, the corporation and the lawyers who represent them. The view
from the corporate counsel's office is very clearly an important one, but it
is through a narrow window.
23. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017, 1017-50 (1996).
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